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THE SIGN OF "THE FOUR": JUDICIAL
ASSIGNMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW
Jonathan L. Entin *
On July 30, 1963, Judge Benjamin Franklin Cameron
threw the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
into turmoil, charging Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle with ma
nipulating the composition of panels in civil rights and deseg
regation cases so as to influence their outcome. l Specifically,
he accused his colleague Tuttle of packing panels with liberal
judges who consistently supported the claims of civil rights
activists. 2 The liberal jurists, whom he derisively character
ized as "The Four," were Tuttle, Richard T. Rives, John Minor
Wisdom, and John R. Brown. 3 According to Judge Cameron,
at least two of The Four sat in twenty-two of the twenty-five
civil rights cases that the Fifth Circuit had heard during the
preceding two years. 4 In the aggregate, The Four sat fifty-five
times in these cases while the other five members of the court
sat only twelve times . Moreover, one of The Four wrote the
opinion in twenty-three of the twenty-five cases. 5

. Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
1 Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1963).
2 Armstrong, 323 F.2d at 353 n.l.
3 [d.
• [d. at 358.
• [d. Cameron listed the cases and the panel membership in an appendix,
and two weeks later added four more cases that he had previously overlooked. [d.
at 359-61. The Four constituted at least a majority of the panel in three of those
cases. [d. at 360-61.
Cameron further complained that he, a Mississippian, was excluded from
three-judge district courts in Mississippi civil rights cases despite what he charac
terized as a previously "universal practice" in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere of
appointing the circuit judge resident in the state to three-judge courts. [d. at 358
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Cameron's sensational charges provoked a storm of con
troversy.6 The suggestion of improper judicial assignment is
always "troubling,"7 but especially under these circumstances.
Cameron had raised the specter of case rigging in the nation's
most sensitive field and its most volatile region: race relations
in the Deep South. Moreover, he had done so in the aftermath
of the violence accompanying the desegregation of the Univer
sity of Mississippi the previous year; contempt proceedings
against the governor and lieutenant governor for their defi
ance in that matter were still pending in the Fifth Circuit. 8
Although Cameron's figures appear at first glance to be
persuasive, there are several possible responses to his charge
of manipulation. One is that his data were inaccurate in cer
tain respects. 9 Jack Bass, a journalist who chronicled the
work of The Four, took this approach. Bass pointed out that
Cameron omitted several cases from his analysis and skewed
the numbers by separately counting every phase of some cases
(particularly the University of Mississippi dispute) that came
before the Fifth Circuit more than once, thereby exaggerating
the number of decisions involving The Four. lo Similarly, Bass
found that the irate judge would have obtained less striking
results if his study had covered a slightly longer time peri

59. Instead, members of The Four were selected to hear these cases. Ed.
• See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 235-40 (1981); FRANK T . READ & Lucy
S. MCGoUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP
SOUTH 268-72, 274-75 (1978); see also HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE
FIFTH CIRCmT, 1891-1981, 120-21 (1984).
7 Cruz v . Abbate, 812 F .2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
8 See generally READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 254-65. There is a sub
stantial literature on the desegregation of Ole Miss. For the perspective of the
man who broke the color line, see JAMES MEREDITH, THREE YEARS IN MISSISSIPPI
(1966). For chronicles by faculty members, see RUSSELL H. BARRETT, INTEGRATION
AT OLE MISS (1965), and JAMES W. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SOCIETY
107-40 (1964). For more recent accounts, see NADINE COHADAS, THE BAND PLAYED
DIXIE 57-106 (1997), and DAVID G. SANSING, MAKING HASTE SLOWLY 156-95
(1990).
• Cameron unquestionably was wrong in one respect: Judge Brown rather
than Chief Judge Tuttle made the assignments. READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6,
at 272.
10 BASS, supra note 6, at 241 , 243-45.
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od. l l Moreover, Bass noted, several of Cameron's cases in
volved issues that had already been settled by the Supreme
Court, so the composition of the panel should not have affect
ed those results. 12 Finally, according to Bass, civil rights
claimants actually lost several cases in which some combina
tion of The Four constituted a majority of the panel. I3
However, Bass's approach misses an important aspect of
the criticism. The issue Cameron raised implicated not only
the outcome of the cases, but the process by which the panels
were selected. 14 From this perspective, his complaint was not
only that panels were chosen with an eye toward influencing
decisions, but also that assignments were not random. 15 An
alternative explanation that responds to this concern focuses
on the scheduling constraints arising from the preferences of
individual judges. 16 There is some evidence for this explana
tion. For example, Cameron himself asked not to be assigned
to any panels that included Chief Judge Tuttle due to their
disagreement over civil rights; another judge did not want to
sit with Cameron because of his insistence on late afternoon
conferences after morning arguments; and a third judge had
serious health problems that prevented him from sitting at all
for most of the two years covered by Cameron's study.17 Only

Id. at 244.
Id.
13 Id.
" See Burke Marshall, Southern Judges in the Desegregation Struggle , 95
HARv. L. REv. 1509, 1514 (1982) (book review).
" Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1963).
Cameron's objection to being excluded from three-judge district courts in Missis
sippi civil rights cases in the face of a tradition of appointing the resident circuit
judge to three-judge courts in cases arising in his state suggests that he did not
necessarily favor strictly random assignment in every case. Armstrong, 323 F .2d
at 358-59.
16 READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 273.
17 Id. Moreover, two other members of the court who had interim appoint
ments were not assigned to civil rights cases for several months in order to avoid
antagonizing powerful segregationists in the Senate who could have blocked their
confirmation. [d.; see BASS, supra note 6, at 240-41; COUCH, supra note 6, at 122.
The propriety of insulating interim judges from hostile senators in this fashion is
beyond the scope of this article. So is the constitutionality of interim judicial ap
pointments, although the courts have upheld this practice. See United States v.
11

12
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three members of the Fifth Circuit-all of them part of The
Four-were available to sit with every one of their col
leagues. 18 Against this background, it seems reasonable that
they would have participated in a disproportionate number of
cases of all types. 19 There is some evidence for this hypothe
sis, although it is far from conclusive. 20
At this point, we can say that Cameron's data provide less
support for his provocative charge of ideologically motivated
assignments than he seemed to believe. There are benign
explanations for at least some of his complaints, and his study
is hardly a model of methodological rigor.
We shall return to Judge Cameron's charges later. Let us
assume for now, though, that he was correct is asserting that
judges in the Fifth Circuit's civil rights cases were not ran
domly assigned to panels. Exactly what is wrong with that?
This is hardly a frivolous question. The relevant federal stat
utes do not require any particular method of judicial assign
ment to cases. In the courts of appeals, three-judge panels are
composed and cases are assigned "as the court directs."zl In

Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305
F.2d 704, 709-12 (2d Cir. 1962). Suffice it to say that these arrangements raise
questions about the independence of persons exercising judicial power under Arti
cle III of the Constitution. C{ Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1014-33 (Norris, J., dissent
ing); Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-Constitutional But Un
wise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124 (1957); Members of Faculty Question Wisdom of Earl
Warren's Recess Appointment, HARv. L. SCH. REc., Oct. 8, 1953, at 1; Henry M.
Hart, Jr., Letter, HARV. L. SCH. REC., Oct. 8, 1953, at 2. But the two Fifth Cir
cuit judges were not unique. Among others who first took the bench under inter
im appointments were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Stewart.
See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 257-58, 266, 272-73 (3d ed.
1992).
I. BASS, supra note 6, at 24l.
19 Id.
20 Id.
From January to October 1961, a period that includes only part of
Cameron's study, "some combination of The Four sat on 159 of the 191 nonrace
cases heard by Fifth Circuit panels." Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994). This provision directs the Federal Circuit to adopt
"a procedure for the rotation of judges from panel to panel to ensure that all of
the judges sit on a representative cross section of the cases heard." Id. No such
language appears in this statute with respect to any other court of appeals. An
other difference between the Federal Circuit and the geographically based circuits
is that the former may sit in panels having more than three members, whereas
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district courts containing more than one judge, cases are to be
"divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders
of the court."22 And in the now infrequently constituted three
judge district courts, the chief judge of the circuit designates
two of the members; except for the requirement that at least
one of these must be a circuit judge, the statute does not oth
erwise specify how these judges are to be chosen. 23 Some
courts have adopted rules or internal operating procedures
governing judicial assignment, but many others (at both the
federal and the state level) appear to have no written policy
on the subject.24
Nevertheless, claims of assignment manipulation clearly
strike a raw nerve. Judges are sensitive to the appearance of
impropriety that might be inferred from unusual assignment
procedures. 25 Moreover, the perception that judicial assign
ments matter is supported by the continuing contentiousness
over judicial appointments. 26 There are also well-documented
efforts to evade customary procedures for assigning cases to
judges. People have gone to jaiF7 and lawyers have been se
verely disciplined2B for trying to circumvent the assignment system.

the latter may not. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994) .
• 2 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1994).
'3 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (1994). The third judge must be the district judge to
whom the case, with its request for the convening of a three-judge court, was
initially assigned. [d.
.. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
•• BASS, supra note 6, at 237-40. Many Fifth Circuit judges were apoplectic
over Cameron's allegations, and Chief Judge Tuttle convened an emergency meet
ing to try to clear the air. [d.; READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 269-71. Cf
Rappaport v. VV Publ'g Corp., 637 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1996) (upholding dis
missal of judge's libel suit on grounds that statements in article that judge was
receiving disproportionate share of certain cases were not defamatory as matter of
law).
26 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over delays in confirming federal
judges, a phenomenon apparently due to political differences between the White
House and the Senate. William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report of the
Federal Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1998, at 1, 3.
27 See, e.g., United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1984); State v.
Jurek, 556 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); State v. McCool, 544 N.E.2d 933
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) .
.. See, e.g., Grievance Adm'r v. August, 475 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 1991) (suspen
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There is a surprisingly large body of case law on judicial
assignment. Most of that case law has arisen in lower-profile
disputes than civil rights and desegregation. The bulk of them
involve judicial assignment at the trial court level, although
the analysis in those cases presumably should apply to analo
gous situations at the appellate level. Some claims in this area
invoke the Constitution, while others rely on various theories
under state law or court rules and procedures. Whatever the
basis for these claims, they rarely succeed even when the facts
suggest that judges were assigned in non-random fashion .
This article will examine the issues ofjudicial assignment.
Then the article will return to the Cameron situation in an
effort to put that controversy into broader perspective. Finally,
the article will consider state procedures that, for practical
purposes, authorize litigants to make peremptory challenges
to judges in certain circumstances. Those procedures have
implications for the discussion of random assignments and for
the way we think about Judge Cameron's charges.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND

JUDICIAL AsSIGNMENT

Manipulation of judicial assignments can deprive litigants
of their right to a fair hearing and contravene basic principles
of due process. As the Supreme Court has put it, due process
"clearly requires a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal.",29 However,
the federal courts, as well as most state courts, have generally
been unreceptive to constitutional challenges to judicial as
signment.
An often-cited case that rejects the argument that the
Constitution requires random assignment is United States v.
Keane. 3o Keane involved the prosecution of a powerful mem
ber of the Chicago city council for mail fraud and conspira
sion); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Jurek, 581 N.E.2d 1356 (Ohio 1991) (disbarment);
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Melamed, 580 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991) (disbar
ment); In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1997) ($10,000 sanction).
29 Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975» .
30 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd in part and reu'd in part on
other grounds, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975).
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cy.31 By local rule, the district court ordinarily assigned cases
randomly.32 In "protracted, difficult or widely publicized" cas
es, however, the rule authorized the chief judge to bypass the
random assignment process and, in consultation with the
court's executive committee, to assign the matter to a particu
lar judge. 33 The defendant claimed that this procedure vio
lated his due process rights, but the executive committee dis
agreed. 34 The judges explained that due process does not give
a party "the right to determine the manner in which his case
is assigned to a judge.,,35 Assignment rules promulgated by
district courts pursuant to the governing federal statutes are
designed "to promote efficiency . . . and the court has a large
measure of discretion in applying them."36
The Keane court's characterization of the defendant's
claim might not have been entirely accurate. He was not as
serting a constitutional right to "determine the manner in
which his case [should be] assigned"; rather, he argued that
he had a constitutional right to random assignment. 37 Sever
al circuit courts have explicitly rejected such an argument. 38
One of those rulings cites Keane for this proposition,39 which
seems to be a fair reading of the logic if not the language of
that decision.
Not all courts have rejected due process claims out of
hand, however. A prominent example is Tyson v. Trigg;O a

Keane, 375 F. Supp. at 1205.
at 1203.
at 1203-04.
at 1204-05.
at 1204.
at 1204-05. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the chief judge's determination that his
case promised to be "protracted, difficult and widely publicized. n [d. at 1205.
37 [d. at 1204-05.
3. See, e.g., Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord People v. Hattery, 539
N.E.2d 368, 379-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). One state court has characterized such a
due process claim as "frivolous. n Dancer v. State, 715 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 n.l
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
•• Sinito, 750 F .2d at 515 .
• 0 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995).
3.

[d.
33 [d.
3' [d.
3' [d.
3. [d.
32
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case involving the former heavyweight boxing champion who
served several years in prison following a rape conviction and
has had other legal difficulties. 41 Mike Tyson argued that the
method for assigning the trial judge in his Indiana rape trial
effectively allowed the prosecutor to choose the judge, which
violated his due process rights.42 Under that system, a prose
cutor who sought an indictment could choose the grand jury
before which to present evidence. 43 Because each judge in the
criminal division supervised only one grand jury and presided
at all trials resulting from that grand jury's indictments, the
prosecutor's selection of a specific grand jury effectively
amounted to choosing the trial judge." Chief Judge Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recognized that, despite the general assumption that judges
are impartial, a litigant who can choose her judge "may be
able to obtain a subtle advantage over the other.,,45 Never
theless, he rejected Tyson's claim, in part due to the procedur
al rigors of habeas corpus law46 and in part for lack of evi
dence that the prosecutor actually selected a particular grand
jury to get the trial assigned to a particular judge:7
Some state courts also have expressed a measure of sym
pathy for constitutional arguments in this context. For exam
ple, a Florida appellate court suggested that a policy that
eliminated random assignment in about half of a trial court's
criminal cases might be unconstitutional,4s but ultimately in-

U
See Brian Mooar & Fern Shen, Two Motorists May File Charges Against
Tyson After Md. Crash, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at A8 (summarizing Tyson's
various legal problems) .
• 2 Tyson, 50 F.3d at 438 .
.. Id.
•• Id. at 438-39 .
•• Id. at 439. Judge Posner also noted that, partly due to criticism of the
procedure in the wake of Tyson's trial, the state adopted a new procedure that
prevents a prosecutor from effectively dictating judicial assignments in criminal
cases. Id.
•• Id. at 439-40.
., Id. at 441-42.
•• State ex rel. Zuberi v. Brinker, 323 So. 2d 623, 625 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (implying that assignment system that treats some criminal cases different
ly than others violates equal protection guarantees).
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validated that policy because it was adopted in violation of
applicable state procedural requirements. 49 The Louisiana
Supreme Court went even further in State v. Simpson ,50
holding that due process requires that felony cases be as
signed randomly or under an alternative mechanism that pre
vents the prosecutor from controlling judicial assignments. 51
Although the Simpson court did not explain the details of the
assignment system that it found unconstitutional, the trial
court apparently gave the prosecutor's office the power to
determine which judge would hear each criminal case, and
that the prosecutor intentionally used that power to select its
preferred judges in many instances. Meanwhile, the same trial
court randomly assigned all civil cases. 52
The evidence that the prosecutor deliberately sought to
use the power to match cases with preferred judges makes
Simpson a much stronger case for finding a due process vio
lation than Tyson. Under the circumstances, it is not surpris
ing that the Simpson court called for random assignment or
something substantially equivalent. However, the difficulties
of enforcing the right have undermined the vitality of any
such constitutional rule. Courts have required a litigant to
show prejudice from a non-random or otherwise improper
judicial assignment. 53 Even in post-Simpson Louisiana, the
courts have rejected numerous claims on harmless error
grounds because the aggrieved party could not show how the
defective assignment prejudiced the case. 54
Judicial reluctance to endorse a constitutional right to
random assignment might reflect the difficulty of implement
ing a sweeping general rule. First, cases are not equivalent.
"
state
••
"

Brinker, 323 So. 2d at 625-26. The new policy was not submitted to the
supreme court for approval as required by applicable rules. [d.
551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1984) (per curiam).
Simpson, 551 So. 2d at 1304.
52 State v. Romero, 552 So. 2d 45, 47-48 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (describing
prosecutor's approach to judicial selection in same trial court as that in Simpson).
03 See, e.g., Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1973).
•• See, e.g., State v. Huls, 676 So. 2d 160, 167 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Romero,
552 So. 2d at 49.

378

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68

Some are easy and some are hard. Some will go to trial, while
most will not (and of those that do not go to trial, some will
settle, whereas others will terminate by a ruling on a disposi
tive motion). Some will attract widespread public attention,
but the vast majority will proceed in obscurity. Because "[a]
case is not a standard measurement,"55 it is inappropriate to
require completely random assignment. Second, some cases
are related-by issue or parties-to other cases. Assigning re
lated cases to the same judge or panel often makes sense on
efficiency grounds. Third, some difficult or sensitive cases
might be better handled by more experienced judges. Fourth,
judges sometimes recuse themselves from cases in which they
have a conflict of interest or their impartiality might be called
into question. Fifth, some cases appear in a court more than
once. This phenomenon occurs, for instance, when a reviewing
court remands a case with instructions for further proceed
ings. Often, although not necessarily in every case, returning
the matter to the same judge or panel that heard it before
conserves judicial resources.
These are not insurmountable difficulties, but they might
be viewed mainly as administrative challenges that do not
implicate due process concerns. 56 At least the judiciary seems
to think so. Therefore, reliance upon constitutional arguments
as a basis for random assignment seems an unpromising
strategy. Courts are generally skeptical of such arguments.
Even those courts that have been rhetorically sensitive to such
claims have required proponents to meet high evidentiary
standards. 57 Instead, the law relating to judicial assignments

so RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 64
(1996).
,. A useful illustration comes from the Fifth Circuit. Faced with widespread
recusals that made it difficult to assign energy regulation cases to regular panels,
for more than two decades the court has had a special panel that hears such
cases. A new panel is drawn each year from the pool of judges who are not dis
qualified. Its members are selected randomly from the pool. See generally DAVID
E. PIERCE & JONATHAN L. ENTIN, EVALUATING THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT OF THE
SPECIAL OIL AND GAS PANEL OF THE U.S . COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT (Federal Judicial Center working paper, 1993).
57 See Sinito, 750 F .2d at 515; Huis, 676 So. 2d at 167.
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has arisen primarily from "the professional standards of the
bench and bar,,,58 particularly from court policies and rules.
II.

OTHER APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL AsSIGNMENT

A. Assignment Rules and Policies

In addition to the flexibility of judicial assignment appar
ently afforded by the Constitution, federal law does not man
date any particular approach to judicial assignment. AF, previ
ously discussed, the statutes governing the courts of appeals
and the district courts leave that process to those tribunals. 59
Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address this subject.
At the circuit level, only one court, the Ninth Circuit, has
adopted rules generally calling for random assignment. 6o The
Ninth Circuit also has promulgated rules calling for random
assignment in certain complex cases. 61 A few other appellate
courts have adopted policies that generally provide for random
assignment. 62 Those circuits that have no explicit rule or poli
cy appear to assign cases more or less randomly.s3 In allocat
ing cases to panels, all circuits take account of the complexity
of the case and other factors that make it unrealistic to treat
every filed appeal as equally demanding of judicial time and
energy.
Many multi-member district courts have adopted explicit
rules or policies generally calling for random assignment of
cases.54 Those systems frequently contain express exceptions
•• Bracy v. Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997) .
•• See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
60 See 9TH CIR. R. Introduction § E(2).
61 [d. R. 22-1(b), 22-3(b) (death penalty); R. 35-3 (limited en banc rehearings
involving chief judge and ten other randomly selected judges) .
•• See 3D CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 1.1; 4TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 34.1; 6TH CIR. INT.
OP. PROC. 19.1-19.2.
.. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 6(b) (noting that in successive appeal,
original panel may opt to decide subsequent appeal or "return the case for reas
signment at random"). Some circuits also make a specific provision for random as
signments in attorney discipline cases. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 46(g)(B); 10TH CIR. R.
ADD. III, § 4.3 .
•• See, e.g., M.D. ALA. R. 40.1; D. ARIZ. R. 1.2(c); S.D. CAL. R. 40.1(a); S.D.
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or authorize departures from strictly random assignment to
promote efficiency. 55 A similar pattern appears at the state
level. Court rules generally govern assignment and typically
involve some form of random procedure, subject to efficiency
or practicability exceptions. 66 Statutory provisions on this
topic are unusual, but they also embody a preference for ran
domness. 67

B. Enforcing Assignment Rules and Policies
Challenges to arbitrary judicial assignments must sur
mount both procedural and substantive hurdles. On the proce
dural side, there are questions of timing and reviewability. On
the substantive side, the challenger usually must show that
some prejudice resulted from the irregular assignment.

1. Procedural Issues
A party who believes that a court has improperly assigned
a judge to the case can challenge the assignment at the outset
of the proceedings. 68 If this fails, it is not clear whether an
interlocutory appeal or an action in mandamus or prohibition
will lie. Although one court has granted a writ of mandamus
compelling reassignment before trial,69 others have refused
relief because the challenged action is either discretionary or
reviewable on direct appeal from a final judgment on the mer-

FLA. R. 3.4(A); S.D.N.Y. R. 1; E.D. WIS. R. 4.01-4.02 .
•• See, e.g., D. COLO. R. 40.1(A); D.D.C. R. 403; N.D. ILL. R. 2.00; N.D. OHIO
R. 57 .9.
•• See, e.g., CAL. CT. APP. 1ST DIST. INT. OP. PROC. 21(a), 26; ILL. APP. CT.
1ST DIST. R. 2(e); MICH. CT. R. 8. 111(B); N.Y. CT. R. 200. l1(b), (e), 202.3(b), (e);
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 36(B)(1)(e). One state court declares that it does not make as
signments "on a random or arbitrary basis," but does not explain how it does
handle this task. OR. CT. APP. INT. PRAC. Introduction n.*.
.., See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. ?ROC. ANN. art. 253.1 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(2) (1986) .
•s See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (lOth Cir. 1972);
United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 522 F .2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975); People v. Bell, 659
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
• 9 Margold v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 858 P.2d 33 (Nev. 1993).
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2. Substantive Issues

On at least two occasions, federal courts of appeals have
overturned judicial assignments in situations of apparent
overreaching by chief judges in multi-member federal district
courts. The relevant statute leaves judicial assignments in
such courts to local rules, with the chief judge retaining re
sponsibility for their proper implementation.71 In Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co. v. Ritter,72 the Tenth Circuit issued a writ of man
damus to overturn a chief judge's reassignment of a case that
should have gone to one of his colleagues. 73 More recently, in
In re McBryde,74 the Fifth Circuit set aside another chief
judge's assertion of authority over cases that had been on one
of his colleagues' docket. 75 Both cases arose in highly unusual
circumstances.
Ritter was part of a long-running judicial feud in the Unit
ed States District Court for the District of Utah. Because the
two judges of that court were unable to agree on the allocation
of business, the Tenth Circuit judicial council imposed its own
assignment system (essentially a random scheme in most
respects).76 When the second judge took senior status almost
fifteen years later, the chief judge reassigned some cases on

70

Coastal Oil N.Y., Inc. v. Newton, 660 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1997); State

ex ret. Berger v. McMonagle, 451 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1983).
71

The statute provides for division of business among district judges:

The business of a court having more than one judge shall be di
vided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the
court.
The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for the
observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and
assign the cases so far as such rules and orders do not otherwise pre
scribe.
28 U.S.C. § 137 (1994).
n 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972).
73 Ritter, 461 F.2d at 1104.
" 117 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1997).
" McBryde, 117 F.3d at 230.
76 Ritter, 461 F.2d at 1102.
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that judge's docket to himself rather than leaving them for the
replacement judge, who was sworn in on the day his predeces
sor went senior.77 The Tenth Circuit held the chief judge's
actions void because the relevant statute precluded unilateral
assignments by the chief judge, and because the circuit judi
cial council's assignment order remained in force despite
changes in the composition of the district court.78
McBryde arose in somewhat less contentious circumstanc
es, but there is reason to suspect the existence of a difficult
personal relationship between the judges involved. The chief
judge reassigned himself two cases that had been on the other
judge's docket after controversy arose about the first judge's
handling of those cases.79 In one case, the judge had held an
assistant United States attorney in contempt for her conduct
in a criminal case. so In the other case, the judge harshly criti
cized the clerk of the court for failing to invest the settlement
proceeds in a wrongful death action in an interest-bearing
account, a failure that apparently cost the decedent's minor
daughter a substantial amount of money.81 According to the
court of appeals, the facts suggested that the chief judge took
over the cases because he disagreed with the other judge's
handling of those matters.82 Although the chief judge has
broad administrative authority to "reassign cases in situations
involving the recusal, death, disability, or new appointment of
a judge,"83 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that allowing reassign
ment motivated only by disapproval of another judge's actions
is "antithetical to and incompatible with the structure of the
federal judicial system.,,84

77

[d.

[d. at 1103-04.
McBryde, 117 F.3d at 208.
8. [d . at 212-13.
81 [d. at 214-15 .
• 2 [d. at 228-29.
83 [d. at 225 .
.. [d. Before reaching its conclusion on the merits, the court of appeals had to
grapple with some difficult jurisdictional questions. The major problem was that
the Fifth Circuit's judicial council had previously approved the chief judge's ac
tions. [d. at 217. The effect of that approval, the panel's appellate jurisdiction
78

7.
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It is understandable that reviewing courts would inter
vene to ameliorate the effects of interpersonal judicial con
flicts. But courts otherwise have been decidedly reluctant to
overturn assignments, even when they disapprove of the way
a case was assigned. 85 Moreover, courts have tended to defer
to decisions to bypass the customary assignment system for
matters that might be related to other cases in the same
court, for dispositions on remand, or for other successive pro
ceedings in the same case. 86
Judicial reluctance to intercede in assignments is reflected
in the widespread requirement that a litigant establish preju
dice from any improper judicial assignment. Mere departure
from a random assignment procedure is insufficient to over
turn a decision. 87 The standard explanation for the prejudice
requirement is that assignment rules are essentially "internal
housekeeping rules" designed to promote judicial efficiency, so
courts have wide discretion in this field. 88
For example, a court may adopt a random assignment
plan that makes only some of its members eligible for selec
over the council's order. and the council's authority to issue the order received
extensive attention in the opinion. [d. at 219-21. 226-30. The difficulty of the
question of jurisdiction over the judicial council's order may be indicated by the
fact that the other two members of the panel declined to join that part of the
opinion. which those judges viewed as unnecessary to resolution of the case. [d.
at 231 (Garza. J., specially concurring); id. (Dennis. J., specially concurring).
In the most recent chapter of this controversy. the Fifth Circuit has ordered
Judge McBryde to recuse himself from two unrelated criminal cases because de
fense counsel in those cases had testified against him in the judicial council pro
ceedings. See United States v. Anderson. No. 97-11205, 1998 WL 781240 (5th Cir.
1998); United States v. Avilez-Reyes, No. 97-11392, 1998 WL 781243 (5th Cir.
1998).
•• See. e.g., United States v. Osum. 943 F.2d 1394 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1355 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985); Okereke v. Kane. 470
N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (App. Div. 1983).
86 See, e.g., Osum. 943 F.2d at 1398.
81 See, e.g., id. at 1399-400; United States v. Gray. 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 675 F .2d 1373. 1385 (9th Cir. 1980); In re
Marriage of Kenik. 536 N.E.2d 982, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
88 Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512. 515 (6th Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Osum.
943 F.2d 1394. 1400-01 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d
154, 157 (9th Cir. 1974); Kruckenberg v. Powell. 422 So. 2d 994. 996 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Blair v. Mackoff. 672 N.E.2d 895. 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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tion in certain classes of cases. 89 Also, courts may assign cas
es involving the same or similar issues outside the customary
assignment process,90 although such assignment is not re
quired. 91 One problem with this is that reasonable persons
can disagree as to what constitutes a "related" case.92 Simi
larly, a court does not have to reassign a case following a
mistrial93 or on remand from a higher court. 94 After some re
mands, however, reassignment is ordered. 95 Whether reas
signment on remand is required depends on the extent to
which the original judge could be expected "to have substan
tial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously
expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous;" the
need "to preserve the appearance of justice;" and a balancing
of the "waste and duplication" caused by reassignment against
the benefits gained. 96
.9 Several courts have approved the practice of limiting the pool of eligible
judges in death penalty cases. See, e.g., People v. Hattery, 539 N.E.2d 368, 380-81
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 469-70 (Sup. Ct. 1997);
People v. Bell, 659 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (Sup. Ct. 1997). C{. United States v. Keane,
375 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (upholding plan limiting pool of judg
es eligible to hear "protracted, difficult or widely publicized" cases), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds , 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975); see supra notes
23-27 and accompanying text.
90 See,
e.g., Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375,
383-84 (2d Cir. 1975); Wayne County Prosecutor v. Parole Bd., 532 N.W.2d 899,
902-03 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam). C{. Stinchcomb v. State, 383 S.E.2d
609 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no reversible error in non-random assignment
based on mistaken belief that case was related to another case assigned to same
judge) .
• 1 See, e.g., Tokars v. Superior Ct., 442 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. 1994) (upholding ran
dom assignment in death penalty case despite local rule favoring assignment of
co-defendants to same judge).
92 See, e.g., Morfesis v. Wilk, 525 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1988) (concluding
unanimously that related cases may be assigned non-randomly, but dividing 3-2
on whether particular cases were in fact related) .
• 3 See United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 925 F.2d 604, 608-09 (2d
Cir. 1991).
94 See, e.g., Brown v. Baden, 815 F .2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
•• See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 785 F .2d 777, 781 (9th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349-50 (9th Cir.
1982). C{. Ash v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 957 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 1992) (allow
ing parties to agree to have case heard on remand by original trial judge despite
court of appeals' order that case be randomly assigned for further proceedings).
•• United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam). See also
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In sum, there seems to be no hard and fast rule requiring
random assignment of judges to cases. Courts apparently
enjoy broad latitude in administering their dockets. Although
challenges to the implementation of assignment plans are not
as difficult to sustain as are constitutional claims, they pres
ent formidable hurdles for most litigants. However, none of
the cases mentioned above involved allegations of bias or par
tiality against judges. That was what Judge Cameron asserted
in his attack on The Four.

III.

JUDGE CAMERON REDUX

If Judge Cameron was correct that the panels in civil
rights and desegregation cases were manipulated to influence
substantive decisions, his charges raised profound issues of
both constitutionality and propriety. 97 As explained above,
there is reason to doubt that assignments were actually made
for that dubious purpose. 98
But we should not lose signt of a fundamentally important
fact: some judges-and Cameron was among the most notori
ous in this respect-simply refuse to accept the legitimacy of
Brown v. Board of Education 99 and other Supreme Court rul
ings against racial discrimination. loo In particular,

Alverson, 666 F.2d at 349; United States v. Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th
Cir. 1980).
97 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F .3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 1995); see Marshall, supra note
14, at 1514.
" See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
99 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100 Cameron consistently voted against African-American litigants during his
tenure on the Fifth Circuit. See Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir.
1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 322 F.2d 356,
362 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d
583, 594 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting), affd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); Unit
ed States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 785 (5th Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Cameron, J., dissenting); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 292 F.2d 4, 4 (5th
Cir. 1961) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Boson v. Rippy, 275 F .2d 850, 853 (5th Cir.
1960) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930, 938 (5th Cir.
1958) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir.
1958) (Cameron, J., dissenting); Avery v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 241 F.2d
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Cameron's performance in connection with the desegregation
of the University of Mississippi raises serious questions about
his fitness to sit in other civil rights cases. In that controver
sy, a panel of the Fifth Circuit (two of whom were among The
Four) directed the district judge to order the African-American
plaintiff, James Meredith, admitted to the University.lol The
day after the mandate issued, Cameron, who was not a mem
ber of the panel, issued a stay (to permit the State to file a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, he said).102 The
panel vacated Cameron's stay, reasoning that it was too late
to recall the mandate and that the Supreme Court could stay
the injunction if that were appropriate. 103 The next day,
Cameron entered another order reinstating his stay.104 The
panel vacated Cameron's second stay the same day it was
issued. 105 Three days later, Cameron entered his third
stay. lOG The panel once more vacated his action. 107 Un
daunted, Cameron entered his fourth stay two days later. lOB
After consulting with his colleagues, Justice Black finally
ended this circus by declaring all of Cameron's orders void and
refusing to issue a stay of the desegregation order. 109
The Fifth Circuit, largely through the work of The Four,
sought to overcome defiance, delay, and recalcitrance by way

230, 235 (5th Cir. 1957) (Cameron, J., dissenting). The only exception located is a
grudging concurrence in United States v. Atkins, 323 F .2d 733, 745 (5th Cir.
1963) (Cameron, J., concurring specially in the result).
101 Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. June 25, 1962).
102 Meredith v.
Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 741 (5th Cir. July 18, 1962)
(Cameron, J.).
103 Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. July 27, 1962).
1.,. Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 742 (5th Cir. July 28, 1962)
(Cameron, J.).
105 Meredith v. Fair, No. 19475 (5th Cir. July 28, 1962) (unreported).
106 Meredith v. Fair,
7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 743 (5th Cir. July 31, 1962)
(Cameron, J.).
107 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 743 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 1962) (per cu
riam).
108 Meredith v. Fair, 7 Race ReI. L. Rep. 744 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1962) (Cameron,
J.).
109 Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10 (Sept. 10, 1962).
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of procedural and doctrinal innovations. 110 Commentators
have lionized their efforts in this regard. III At the same
time, those efforts have prompted some sympathetic lawyers
and scholars to raise questions about the wisdom and desir
ability of some of their innovations.1l2 Devising a method to
exclude the Camerons of the world from hearing cases in
which they plainly would not follow the law is easy to justi
fy.1l3 It is more difficult to swallow an effort to marginalize
cautious or hesitant judges. 1l4 However, that does not seem
to be what happened in the Fifth Circuit. The most that can
be said about Cameron's charges is that they were not
proven. 115
See READ & MCGoUGH, supra note 6, at 272-73.
See generally BASS, supra note 6.
112 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 14, at 1512, 1514.
113 Cameron's indefensible conduct might explain why the Fifth Circuit never
adopted a policy of hearing desegregation cases en bane, as the Fourth Circuit
did. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on
u.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1672 (1998). Cameron would have
been eligible to sit in en bane proceedings. Although some members of the Fourth
Circuit were exceedingly cautious in civil rights cases, none was as recalcitrant as
he was. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Confirmation Process and the Quality of
Political Debate, 11 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 407, 412-14 (1993) (discussing civil
rights record of Judge Clement Haynsworth, whose nomination to Supreme Court
was defeated partIy on this basis).
114 There is one last question to consider, a question that goes beyond the
intricacies of legal doctrine: how much difference did the judiciary make in deseg
regation? This is a large and difficult subject that has generated a substantial
literature. The basic facts are now well known. During the first decade after
Brown, when almost the only sustained federal implementation activities were
those of the district courts and the courts of appeals, public school desegregation
in the Deep South was negligible. See, e.g., J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY
MEN (1961). The situation changed dramatically when the executive and legisla
tive branches took a larger role. The passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibited federal funding of racially discriminatory programs, and
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which made available un
precedented amounts of federal school assistance, promoted substantial desegre
gation within a few years. See GARY ORFIEW, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH
ERN EDUCATION (1969); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 47-54 (1991).
Similarly, the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided powerful lever
age against discriminatory practices that had effectively excluded African Ameri
cans from the political process and led to the registration of millions of new vot
ers. See, e.g., STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS 329-52 (1976); RoSENBERG,
supra, at 59-63.
'" This is not to say that Cameron's charges have been forgotten. One judge
110
111
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IV. JUDICIAL PEREMPrORIES AND RANDOM AsSIGNMENT

Cameron raised disturbing questions in a highly sensitive
context. Those questions implicate important general features
of our judicial system. At this more general level, the difficulty
of successfully challenging non-random judicial assignments
reflects the difficulty of proving anything more than a symbol
ic or procedural injury. We should not exaggerate the impor
tance of a judge's identity or personal characteristics,116 but
a party who has a favorable judge "may be able to obtain a
subtle advantage over the . . . [adversary because the judge
could be] more likely to resolve close questions in that party's
favor."1l7
Some states have embodied that intuition in statutes and
policies that effectively allow litigants to exercise a limited
form of peremptory challenge against a judge assigned to their
case. These measures go beyond for-cause disqualification
statutes that require a showing of bias or an appearance of
impropriety.ll8 Rather, they demand, at most, the timely fil
ing of a good-faith request for substitution of a judge while
strictly limiting the number of such requests. 119
Moreover, although federal law currently does not provide

who joined the Fifth Circuit long after that episode referred to it in an interview
about the court's special panel for energy regulation cases. See generally PIERCE
& ENTIN, supra note 56.
116 See Gregory C. Sisk et ai., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
117 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1995).
118 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994).
119 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 1996); 735 ILL. COMPo STAT.
ANN. § 5/2-1001 (West 1992); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/114-5 (West 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-36-5-1 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804 (1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (Michie
Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.58 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20
(West Supp. 1997). For a comprehensive discussion of these and other statutes,
and of judicial rulings and commentary, see State V . Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703,
705-26 (Wis. 1982); see also Hornaday V. Rowland, 674 P.2d 1333, 1341-44 (Alas
ka 1983); People ex reI. Baricevic v. Wharton, 556 N.E.2d 253, 255-61 (Ill. 1990);
People V. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 891-97 (Ill. 1988); Traynor v. Leclerc, 561
N.W.2d 644, 647-50 (N.D. 1997); State ex rei. Ray Wells, Inc. V. Hargreaves, 761
P .2d 1306, 1306-10 (Or. 1988).
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for peremptory challenges of judges, such a procedure has its
advocates. For example, the original version of the proposed
Judicial Reform Act of 1997 contained language authorizing
parties to federal civil actions to obtain one substitution of
judge as a matter of right. 120
Although these devices for peremptory challenges against
judges are not available in most states or in federal court, and
are strictly limited in those jurisdictions that permit them,
their very existence implies an ambivalence about random
assignment of judges. This ambivalence resembles our difficul
ty in thinking clearly about race- and gender-based perempto
ry challenges of prospective jurors: at one level we want to be
lieve that race and gender are irrelevant to juror decision
making, but at another level we recognize that these factors
can make a difference. 121 As long as we remain ambivalent
about how much a particular judge matters, our legal system
will not require a strictly random assignment ofjudges. At the
same time, it will properly condemn deliberate efforts to influ
ence case outcomes, however subtly, by manipulating judicial
assignments.

H.R. 1252, 105th Cong., § 4 (1997).
For a sophisticated analysis of these issues, see Eric L. Muller, Solving the
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment,
106 YALE L.J . 93 (1996).
120
121

